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CHAPTER 1: SPECIFIC AIMS
Although some age-related decline in memory functioning is normal, many middle-aged
or older individuals interpret everyday memory lapses as indicators of the development of
dementia, or Alzheimer’s disease (AD) in particular.

While a fleeting thought about the

development of AD may not be harmful, repeated misperception of attention and memory
failures can be much more detrimental. This phenomenon, known as fear of Alzheimer’s disease
(FAD) or anticipatory dementia, may lead to hyper-vigilance for AD symptoms, decreased selfefficacy, depression and anxiety. These symptoms reciprocally worsen attention and memory
performance, potentially creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of memory decline.
Despite the negative impact of FAD in the middle-aged and older adult populations, few
studies have been conducted to assess the construct. Little is known about the conceptual
overlap between FAD and other important metacognitive processes, such as prospective
appraisal of memory abilities and subjective memory complaints (SMCs).

Furthermore,

researchers have not yet established the relationship between FAD and objective memory ability.
Although FAD has been tied to greater trait-level anxiety (French, Floyd, Wilkins & Osato,
2012), little is known about the practical implications that FAD has on compensatory cognitive
and health behaviors.
A primary goal of this study was to establish the construct validity of FAD through
assessing its conceptual overlap with Judgment of Learning (JOL) and SMCs. Although one
scale currently exists to evaluate general fear, physical symptoms, and catastrophic attitude
associated with FAD (French, Floyd, Wilkins & Osato, 2011), this scale has shortcomings.
There are several potentially important aspects of the construct, including knowledge about AD
development and prevalence, and locus of control/self-efficacy for preventing or treating
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dementia, which are not included in the FAD construct. The present study has also developed
and validated a new scale of FAD that assesses different dimensions of the construct more
effectively than existing measures.
A second aim of the study was to investigate the relative ability of different types of
metamemory tests to explain variance in objective memory functioning. The study assessed how
SMCs, FAD, and metacognitive monitoring during a Judgment of Learning task account for
variance on an objective memory test.
A third aim of the study was to investigate the relationships between FAD and
metacognitive monitoring and control. The study examined how individuals with high and low
FAD estimate their memory ability for a list-learning task. This judgment of learning task
informs whether middle-aged and older adults with varying levels of FAD update their memory
appraisals based on self-monitoring of performance on the task. Finally, the study investigated
the extent to which individuals with different levels of FAD utilize metacognitive control, or
behavioral strategies to compensate for their perceived memory problems.
Specific Aim 1
The study evaluated the construct validity of fear of Alzheimer’s disease (FAD) using
measures of general negative affect, subjective memory complaints (SMCs), judgment of
learning (JOL), and a novel measure of FAD. It was hypothesized that (a) individuals with a
family history of Alzheimer’s disease would have greater FAD. Also, it was proposed that FAD
is positively associated with (b) SMCs and (c) general negative affect. FAD was also expected
to be (d) negatively associated with JOL appraisals and accuracy of those appraisals. It was also
hypothesized that (e) negative affect, SMCs and JOL would account for a relatively small
proportion of variance in FAD, as FAD is a unique construct. Last, it was hypothesized that (f)
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scores on a newly developed scale of FAD are related to scores on existing measures of FAD,
but do not overlap completely. It was proposed that the novel measure assesses new aspects of
FAD not covered by these existing tests, including knowledge about normal versus abnormal
forgetting in older adulthood, prevalence and causes of and treatments available for AD, healthspecific and AD-specific locus of control, beliefs about personal susceptibility to AD, negative
affect related to AD thoughts, and specific fears and living with AD.
Specific Aim 2
The study determined the relative ability of FAD, SMCs, JOL appraisal (metacognitive
monitoring) and engagement in compensatory behaviors (metacognitive control) to account for
variance in objective memory functioning in cognitively intact older adults. It was hypothesized
that (a) SMCs, FAD and difference in study behavior (study time on self-paced list-learning
trials as compared to matched computer-paced trials) are not significantly associated with
objective memory functioning. However, (b) JOL estimates were expected to account for a
significant proportion of variance in objective memory functioning. It was also hypothesized that
(c) of all the FAD and metacognitive variables, metacognitive monitoring accounts for the most
variance in objective memory functioning after controlling for age and education.
Specific Aim 3
The study determined whether FAD is associated with changes in metacognitive
monitoring accuracy and implementation of control strategies in cognitively intact older adults.
It was hypothesized that (a) metacognitive monitoring, in the form of JOL estimates, is
significantly associated with metacognitive control, measured by study time on subsequent trials.
It was also hypothesized that (b) individuals low in FAD produce smaller difference scores
between the predicted and actual number of items remembered across all learning trials. They
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were also expected to study a list of 20 words for a shorter amount of time than individuals high
in FAD, and to vary study time based on perceived performance (i.e. utilize longer study time
when objective memory performance was below expectation). Conversely, (c) individuals high
in FAD were expected to underestimate their memory ability for all trials, creating larger
difference scores between the predicted and actual number of items recalled.

It was

hypothesized that they would not increase their study time based on perceived task performance.
Instead, they were expected to consistently utilize the maximum study time allotted, regardless
of trial, perceived ability level or performance.
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CHAPTER 2: GENERAL BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
It is estimated that approximately 5.4 million Americans were diagnosed with
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) in 2012, over 95% of whom were over the age of 65 (Hebert, Scherr,
Bienias, Bennett, & Evans, 2003). Furthermore, one in nine people over the age of 65 and onethird of people over the age of 85 will be diagnosed with the disease (Alzheimer’s Association,
2014). Dementia, and AD in particular, is a problem of growing concern not only for the aging
baby-boomer generation, but also for their caretakers, who make up over 15 million Americans
(Alzheimer’s Association, 2012). The costs of short- and long-term healthcare and hospice for
individuals with AD are significant, totaling an estimated 150 billion dollars in the United States
alone (Alzheimer’s Association, 2014).
Public perception of AD has changed with increased scientific knowledge about the
disorder. While the majority of people in the United States are aware of AD as a source of
memory problems, very few individuals have specific knowledge about AD symptoms,
preventative lifestyle changes, and treatments (Anderson, Day, Beard, Reed, & Wu, 2009). A
lack of specific knowledge about AD or its etiology may contribute to widespread concern about
development of the disorder.

In the population of Americans 18 years of age and older,

approximately 60% cite major concern about age-related memory loss (Anderson, Day, Beard,
Reed & Wu, 2009).
For younger adults, fear of developing AD is poignant but abstract. For middle-aged and
older adults, everyday ‘normal’ lapses in memory may provide concrete ‘evidence’ for greater
worry. For example, while a failure to remember an appointment, the location of one’s keys, or
the name of a new acquaintance might not be interpreted in the context of AD risk in younger
adults, middle-aged and older adults might perceive these instances as harbingers of a more
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significant and frightening memory disorder. This fear of Alzheimer’s disease (FAD), also
known as anticipatory dementia, has significant impacts on health, regardless of whether the fear
is warranted. FAD may contribute to the 6-10% prevalence rate of anxiety disorders among
older adults (Schuurmanns & van Balkom, 2011). Anxiety disorders, in turn, have significant
negative impacts on health, including seeking of more somatic health care visits but decreased
use of mental health care services, poorer cardiac health, and increased mortality in men or frail
older adults (Schuurmans & van Balkom, 2011). Despite evidence to the contrary (Schurrmans
& van Balkom, 2011), there is a popular belief that anxiety and other affective problems may be
an early indicator of dementia. In the case of FAD, this anxiety is circular; having greater fear of
developing dementia causes anxiety, which is seen as confirmation of the impending cognitive
decline.
Memory functioning is critical for the performance of day-to-day tasks and independent
living, but awareness of one’s memory and other cognitive abilities is equally important.
Metacognition refers to the thoughts, beliefs, and mental processes used to assess and control
cognition. In regards to memory specifically, metacognition refers to the monitoring of one’s
memory successes and failures, as well as the difficulty of encoding and retrieving information
(Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & Afflerbach, 2006; Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011). Meta-memory
also refers to control, the motivation and direction of one’s behaviors to compensate for these
failures in order to increase successes (Veenman, Van Hout-Wolters, & Afflerbach, 2006;
Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011). Older adults fearful of developing dementia may monitor their
memory failures more closely and may be more sensitive to retrieval struggles than older adults
who feel less vulnerable to AD. Older adults high in FAD may also control their behavior in
particular ways to accommodate their perceived memory impairments, such as utilizing
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calendars and written mnemonic aids, relying on family members or caregivers for reminders, or
seeking of medical treatment.
Significance of the Current Study
In the context of existing research that has examined these behaviors, it appears that a
better understanding of the construct of FAD is needed. Furthermore, whether or to what extent
it might relate to and impact objective memory functioning and meta-memory has received
relatively little attention in the research literature. This study will develop and validate a novel
measure of FAD, and it will use this measure to determine the extent to which FAD interferes
with memory monitoring and compensation for poor perceived memory. This research also
provides important benefits for clinical work. A novel measure will greatly improve assessment
of dementia-specific worry, allowing for identification of older adults at greater risk for anxiety
disorders and associated problems. Better understanding of the relationship between FAD,
SMCs, metacognitive monitoring and actual memory performance may provide the basis for a
predictive model of objective memory functioning.

Furthermore, the study will allow

researchers to identify individuals who might benefit from psychoeducation about normal
memory aging and AD, balancing of expectations about cognitive decline, and training in
compensatory memory strategies. This study may also identify individuals more likely to rely on
memory aids, cognitively challenging activities and games to improve their own performance,
versus individuals who may rely on caregivers to monitor and accommodate memory decline.
The following sections include a more detailed review of the current research on FAD,
SMCs, and metacognitive monitoring and control of memory abilities. The function of this
review is to provide a context for the current study and identify gaps in the literature that may be
addressed by the current study.
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Fear of Alzheimer’s Disease
FAD, also known as anticipatory dementia, was originally conceptualized as the tendency
of adult children of AD patients to be worried that their age-associated memory changes are a
signal of impending cognitive decline due to AD (Cutler & Hodgson, 1996). This phenomenon
is not restricted to children of AD patients but is a widespread concern for middle-aged and older
adults (Cutler & Hodgson, 1996). Approximately 60% of American and European individuals
(Anderson, Day, Beard, Reed & Wu, 2009; Cantegreil-Kallen & Pin, 2012) and 46% of Israeli
older adults (Werner, 2002) cite memory impairment as a major source of concern. In France,
perception of the seriousness of AD has increased in recent years (Leon et al., 2015). In parallel,
belief in the efficacy of treatments and the normalcy of memory loss with age has decreased
(Leon et al., 2015).
In attempting to explain why healthy people might perceive their memory problems as
disordered, researchers have found that greater knowledge of the disorder not only fails to
inoculate people against worry, but it may actually increase that worry (Cutler & Hodgson, 2001;
Roberts and Connell, 2000). Despite having better knowledge of dementia symptoms, causes,
and risk factors, many people overestimate the heritability of AD (Roberts & Connell, 2000),
leading to greater fear in adult children of AD patients (Cutler & Hodgson, 1996; 2001; Roberts
& Connell, 2000). Furthermore, number of family members with the disease is positively
correlated with FAD (Cutler & Hodgson, 2001). Even without a genetic vulnerability to the
disease, serving as a caregiver to someone with AD appears to increase one’s personal concerns
about memory impairments (Cantegreil-Kallen & Pin, 2012; Leon et al., 2015).
Perceived memory abilities also increase one’s level of FAD, with greater frequency of
SMCs (Cutler & Hodgson, 1996; 2001) or perception of a recent change in memory functioning

9
(Cutler & Hodgson, 2001) associated with more fear. Among demographic predictors of FAD,
being married (Cutler & Hodgson, 2001), older (Cutler & Hodgson, 2001; Cantegreil-Kallen &
Pin, 2012), female (Cantegreil-Kallen & Pin, 2012), having a higher educational or occupational
level, or being unmarried or female with a living relative diagnosed with AD are associated with
greater fear (Cutler & Hodgson, 1996; 2001). FAD has also been linked to overall health beliefs,
with poorer perceived overall health being associated with greater fear of developing
Alzheimer’s disease (Cantegreil-Kallen & Pin, 2012).
FAD represents a barrier to early detection of Alzheimer’s disease or other dementias
(Corner & Bond, 2004). Individuals who are fearful of their memory problems may not be able
to distinguish their everyday memory failures from true indications of decline. People high in
personal concern about AD are more likely to seek medical attention for their memory
complaints (Ramakers et al., 2009), which allows for better screening but greater cost for these
individuals. Furthermore, these individuals are likely to use compensatory mnemonic strategies
(ex. calendars, lists, schedules, memory training games) less often or less effectively than
individuals with more accurate appraisal of their memory.

If memory decline is seen as

inevitable and uncontrollable, motivation for early identification, treatment, and preparation may
be lessened. Ultimately, anxiety about loss of one’s identity, dignity, or independence might
cause individuals who are fearful about the etiology of their memory lapses to be less willing to
ask for help (Corner & Bond, 2004).
Until recently, FAD was usually measured using a single question, such as “I would like
to ask how concerned you are about personally developing Alzheimer’s disease. Would you say
that you are very concerned, somewhat concerned, not very concerned, or not at all concerned?”
(Cutler & Hodgson, 1996; Cutler & Hodgson, 2001, p. 338), or very few questions (Roberts &
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Connell, 2000). In 2012, French, Floyd, Wilkins, & Osato developed the Fear of Alzheimer’s
Disease Scale (FADS) as a response to the limited assessment of FAD symptoms in research and
clinical practice. The FADS contains three scales – General Fear, Physical Symptoms, and
Catastrophic Attitude, and it is highly correlated with trait anxiety as measured by the STAI-T
(French, Floyd, Wilkins & Osato, 2012). A Korean version of the scale has also been validated,
with good psychometric properties for the assessment of anticipatory dementia (Moon, Kim,
Hoi, Oh & Chan, 2014). This scale should be recognized as the first attempt to measure FAD
comprehensively, using a psychometrically sound instrument; however, the FADS does not
assess some important constructs associated with FAD. Alongside physical, emotional and
cognitive reactions to thinking about AD, a more comprehensive measure of FAD would also
assess knowledge of normal vs. AD-impaired memory functioning, knowledge about causes
(including heritability) and treatments of AD, attitudes towards treatments for AD, beliefs about
personal susceptibility to AD or quality of life with AD, and self-efficacy in handling an AD
diagnosis.
In this study, FAD is conceptualized as developing from a combination of poor
metacognitive appraisal of one’s abilities, plus limited self-efficacy to change, control, or handle
an AD diagnosis. As such, a comprehensive measure of AD must not only ask about one’s
perceived susceptibility to an AD diagnosis but also one’s perceived ability to handle the
diagnosis, if one were to be diagnosed. The Health Belief Model (HBM; Rosenstock et al.,
1988) may provide a social learning theory model through which FAD may be better understood.
The health belief model is used to understand and predict engagement in health and lifestyle
behaviors and to assess attitudes about chronic illness. In its most basic form, the HBM asserts
that perceived threat of a disorder or injury is combined with one’s outcome expectations for
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trying to address or change risk for the disorder to yield self-efficacy, or one’s perceived ability
to cope with or change the disorder or injury. In the case of FAD, the perceived threat of AD
would arise from beliefs about one’s personal susceptibility to the disorder and beliefs about the
seriousness of the disorder. Outcome expectations for AD would arise from beliefs about
availability and effectiveness of treatment options or preventative lifestyle changes to slow or
stop the development of AD. High perceived susceptibility, strong negative beliefs about quality
of life with AD, and few perceived ways to minimize AD course or severity would lead to lower
self-efficacy and greater FAD.
Although it likely represents a distinct construct in its own right, FAD likely shares a
conceptual overlap with tendency to notice and report everyday memory failures, or SMCs.
Subjective Memory Complaints
Subjective memory complaints (SMCs) are everyday complaints about perceived
memory failures. The prevalence of memory complaints in healthy, non-demented older adults
is at least 10% (Jungwirth et al., 2004). There is some evidence to suggest that SMCs may
represent subtle functional changes in the brain before objective memory problems develop.
Indeed, SMCs are among the diagnostic criteria for mild cognitive impairment, according to the
most recent International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10, 2014). It is unclear if biological
risk factors for AD are truly linked to greater subjective memory problems.

Some studies

conclude that the apolipoprotein E epsilon-4 allele, a major genetic susceptibility marker for AD,
is associated with increased SMCs (Small et al., 1999), and others negate the association
between AD biomarkers and SMCs (Buckley et al., 2013). Studies also question whether SMCs
truly reflect objective memory deficits. There is evidence that older adults with poorer general
intellectual ability or specific memory ability (Small et al., 1999; Balash et al., 2013) or older
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men with poorer episodic memory functioning (Volz-Sidiropoulou & Gauggel, 2012) report
more SMCs. Conversely, correlational and longitudinal studies of healthy older adults suggest
that objective memory functioning does not predict frequency or severity of SMCs (Jungwirth et
al., 2004; Ponds, Van Boxtel, & Jolles, 2000; Lenehan, Klekociuk, & Summers, 2012). England
Amariglio et al. (2011) have presented evidence that different types of memory complaints may
be differentially predictive of objective memory abilities, with certain SMCs (ex. difficulty
following a group conversation, trouble finding one’s way around familiar streets) accounting for
a greater proportion of variance in objective memory abilities. Researchers have also questioned
the ability of SMCs to predict conversion to Alzheimer’s disease.

A prospective study

conducted with individuals above the age of 75 suggests that SMCs predict AD conversion only
in individuals high in overall IQ, and that objective memory ability is a stronger, more universal
predictor of AD conversion in individuals of any intellectual level (Jungwirth et al., 2008).
There is a large body of evidence suggesting that SMCs may be more influenced by
affect or personality than actual memory functioning. Healthy older adults endorsing higher
levels of anxiety and depression report more frequent or severe memory complaints (Balash et
al., 2013; Buckley et al., 2013, Jungwirth et al., 2004, Ponds, Van Boxtel, & Jolles, 2000), and
SMC severity is only associated with age (and not memory ability) in the mildly cognitively
impaired (Buckley et al., 2013). Personality traits like neuroticism and negative affect may also
account for variance in SMCs (Dux et al., 2008; Pearman, 2009; Merema, Speelman, Foster &
Kaczmarek. 2013). More specifically, anxiety sensitivity may moderate the relationship between
subjective and objective memory functioning such that individuals high in anxiety sensitivity
will report more memory complaints, even in the absence of memory dysfunction (Dux et al.,
2008). Independent of the influence of mood disorder, higher perceived stress also increases
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memory complaints (Potter, Hartman, & Ward, 2009). This finding provides an explanation for
the relationship between FAD and SMCs; greater FAD and associated worry about future
healthcare and financial needs, relationships and losses may drive higher stress levels, which
increases attention to memory functioning and, therefore, memory complaints.
While SMCs are unstructured private assessments of one’s own personal memory
functioning, it is unclear if they relate to structured assessments of memory ability or actual
memory performance. Metacognitive tasks that require the participant to prospectively estimate
his or her memory performance on a structured task may have greater objectivity and clinical
utility.
Metamemory
Metacognition is defined as “thoughts, beliefs, and other cognitive processes devoted to
assessing and controlling one’s own cognitions” (Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011, p. 61).
Metamemory, an instance of metacognition, includes the cognitive processes related to appraisal
and direction of one’s memory. Although SMCs rely somewhat on metacognitive processes, the
two constructs are not the same. While SMCs are subjective evaluations of everyday memory
functioning, such as the failure to remember where one left one’s keys, metamemory is assessed
using formal and objective prospective and retrospective tasks.

Two such paradigms, the

Judgment of Learning (JOL) and Feeling of Knowing (FOK) tasks, ask the respondent to
prospectively evaluate their performance on a memory task during the encoding or retrieval
stage, respectively. In a JOL test, the respondent is presented with a stimulus – often word pairs
or a word list – and must appraise the likelihood that the paired words or a certain number of
items will be recalled at a later time (Souchay et al., 2013). In a FOK task, the respondent is
shown a stimulus (again, either word pairs or a word list), is given an opportunity to recall the
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associated pair or items, and he or she is then asked to appraise the likelihood of recognizing the
missed targets at a later time (Souchay et al, 2013). Through these tasks, researchers are able to
estimate the accuracy or ‘resolution’ of metacognitive appraisals as well as the confidence with
which a respondent holds their appraisal.
Metacognition has also been conceptualized as involving a dual process of monitoring
and control (Nelson and Narens, 1990 in Souchay et al., 2013).

Metamemory monitoring

describes the subjective evaluation of memory functioning in different situations. Metamemory
control describes the behaviors that are enacted to maximize memory functioning (Souchay et
al., 2013). In 1988, Nelson and Leonesio proposed a model of the relationship between these
two concepts. Known as the ‘monitoring affects control hypothesis,’ this feedback model
suggests that ongoing appraisal of one’s memory functioning in relation to the task demands of a
given situation drives one to control one’s memory by guiding thoughts and behaviors and
implementing compensatory or mnemonic strategies (in Souchay et al., 2013). Control strategies
may range from small-scale changes in how a task is approached to significant lifestyle changes
that might preserve memory functioning. There is some evidence to suggest that the perceived
effectiveness of different control strategies changes with age, with younger adults rating taskspecific control strategies (ex. using mnemonic devices) and older adults rating lifestyle changes
(“use it or lose it” mental exercising) as most effective in improving memory (Hertzog, McGuire,
Horhota, & Jopp, 2010).
Metacognitive Monitoring. While some research suggests that healthy older adults
make accurate estimations of their memory performance, there is considerable individual
variability in monitoring (Clare, Whitaker, & Nelis, 2010). Despite age-related changes in
episodic memory and poorer source memory for encoded information, cognitively-intact older
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adults appear to have similar FOK (Eakin & Hertzog, 2012) and JOL (Hertzog & Dunlosky,
2011) resolution to those of younger adults. Conversely, AD patients’ monitoring of their
memory is often inaccurate, with most individuals overestimating their abilities and some
individuals underestimating their abilities (Clare, Whitaker, & Nelis, 2010).
Beyond Alzheimer’s dementia and age, a range of factors may impact
metacognitive resolution.

Metacognitive monitoring accuracy is positively correlated with

education in both healthy older adults and in older adults with diagnosed AD (Szajer & Murphy,
2013).

Metacognitive monitoring appraisals are also shaped by social norms and cultural

expectations. For instance, older adults from Sardinia, a cultural region known for longevity, are
more likely to expect memory stability or even improvement than adults from a cultural region
not known for longevity (e.g. Milanese; Bottiroli, Cavallini, Fastame, & Hertzog, 2013). The
older adults from longer-living cultures may provide higher appraisals of their abilities based on
their societal expectations.

Furthermore, older adults from longer-living societies attribute

memory stability or improvement throughout old age to a wider range of causes, such as fate,
heredity, memory ability, memory training, nutrition, others’ opinions, and personal task
importance (Bottiroli, Cavallini, Fastame, & Hertzog, 2013).
Metacognitive Control. Even if monitoring resolution is high and one can identify when
an item is or is not correctly encoded, control is essential for adapting behavior and cognition
based on this knowledge. Without redirection of attention and implementation of strategies for
poorly learned items, one cannot benefit from improved memory performance. It appears that,
unlike metacognitive monitoring, metacognitive control may be impaired in healthy older adults.
Although older adults can accurately estimate that items presented less frequently at encoding
will be harder to recall, they cannot use this information to change the strategies by which they

16
learn the items or to identify the source of the items (Kuhlmann & Touron, 2011). Furthermore,
while younger and older adults believe (incorrectly) that remembering read paired-associates
would be easier than remembering generated pairs, younger adults allocate study time based on
these ratings, while older adults do not (Froger et al., 2011).
Despite poor control abilities, researchers and clinicians can take advantage of spared
monitoring and belief in the efficacy of memory training to instruct older adults in better
compensatory strategies for declining memory. For instance, older adults can be taught to test
their memory appraisals against actual performance immediately after learning, and to allocate
further study time to items failed during self-test (Bailey, Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2010). Training
on self-testing and study allocation is more effective than traditional strategies encouraged
during learning, such as building of semantic or imagery mnemonics (Dunlosky, Kubat-Silman,
& Hertzog, 2003; Bailey, Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2010). These training strategies may be critical
for improving older adults metamemory, objective memory functioning and, ultimately, their
ability to continue to live independently.
Study Summary
Despite the increased prevalence of AD and memory concerns more broadly, the
relationship between metacognitive evaluations of memory functioning and objective memory
performance has not been widely studied.

It is also unclear how FAD might impact the

relationship between perceived and actual memory performance.

Furthermore, FAD has

undergone limited validation as a construct related to but distinct from everyday SMCs or
metacognitive monitoring and control. Last, research has not elucidated the impact of FAD on
the monitoring-control process that appears to be important for adaptation to cognitive changes
in late life.

More specifically, it is not known whether having high FAD might interfere with
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accurate monitoring of learning and retrieval or may interrupt one’s ability and motivation to put
into place effective compensatory control strategies. The current study aimed to address the
above gaps in the literature by developing a novel measure of FAD that would tap into a more
comprehensive set of domains than previous measures. This measure has the potential to be of
considerable clinical utility. In addition, such a short questionnaire might be integrated into a
larger psychological or cognitive battery or given by a primary care provider to assist with
identifying older adults at risk for anxiety disorders. This study also aimed to understand the
relationships between FAD, other metacognitive measures, and objective memory functioning.
By understanding the relative amount of variance in objective memory abilities in healthy adults
accounted for by SMCs, metacognitive appraisal of learning on a specific task, and FAD,
researchers and clinicians may be able to characterize the nature of normal age-related memory
changes more effectively. The current study also investigated the extent to which FAD impacts
memory monitoring and the execution of compensatory control behaviors when memory is
perceived as failing. This goal is critical from an intervention standpoint. Understanding these
relationships will allow researchers to identify individuals who are more likely to use
compensatory study or memory aids, to seek treatment for their memory complaints, and to
successfully identify when their memory failures put them in dangerous situations. Conversely,
the research will also allow for identification of older adults who may under- or over-estimate
their memory abilities and may fail to implement strategies or seek treatments appropriately.
This latter group of individuals may also prove to be more vulnerable to anxiety, depression, or a
failure to pursue an engaged lifestyle. The study findings may allow researchers to identify those
individuals who would be most at risk for these disorders, who are most likely to benefit from
psycho-education about normal memory aging and training on metacognitive control strategies.
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD
The following method was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board of
Wayne State University and the Institute of Gerontology Healthier Black Elders Review Board.
Participant Recruitment
A power analysis was used to calculate the number of participants required to achieve
adequate power for the analyses used in the current study. For bivariate correlations, assuming a
power level of .80, one-tailed α = .0042 (Bonferroni-adjusted for multiple comparisons), and a
predicted small to moderate r effect size of 0.35, the required sample size per group would be n =
93. For multiple regression, assuming a power level of .80, α = .00625 (Bonferroni-adjusted for
multiple comparisons), a predicted small to moderate R2 effect size of 0.25 and a maximum of
ten predictors, the required sample size per group would be n = 85. The study therefore recruited
94 participants to ensure adequate power to detect group differences.
Participants were recruited from multiple sources. A large proportion of participants
were recruited through the participant research pool of the Healthier Black Elders (HBE)
organization at the Wayne State University Institute of Gerontology (WSU IOG). The HBE is a
group of professionals and volunteers from the Detroit area dedicated to advancing the health of
older African-Americans through research, education, and healthcare initiatives. Part of the
HBE’s mission involves encouraging African-American older adults to participate in research.
As such, the HBE maintains a list of Detroit-area residents interested in participating in approved
research studies. The current study utilized a subset of this list based on inclusion/exclusion
criteria to identify potential participants.

The study was also advertised through short

presentations at local community talks geared towards older adult health, flyers distributed in
local public libraries, communities of faith, exercise groups, and senior centers, and through
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word of mouth.
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
In an attempt to maximize the range of scores on the FADS and other FAD measures,
researchers recruited an approximately equal number of individuals with and without a family
history of Alzheimer’s disease or other dementia. Family history positive participants were
defined as having at least one blood relative with dementia diagnosed by a medical professional;
cases who listed family members they believed to have dementia were not counted in the family
history positive group.
Although participants were permitted to report SMCs, individuals who had been
previously diagnosed with Mild Cognitive Impairment, dementia, or another memory disorder
were excluded from the study. Given the focus of the study on metacognition, self-monitoring,
and personal concern about susceptibility to AD, individuals who had previously ruled out
dementia or AD through a clinical evaluation were also excluded from the study.

All

participants were living independently in the community.
Additional exclusion criteria included a history of significant neurological problems (i.e.,
stroke, head injury with loss of consciousness as an adult, seizures, or other neurological
condition), current psychiatric disorder for which the individual is taking medication, or
uncorrected visual or hearing impairments.
Sample Characteristics
Participants included 93 community-living individuals.

Sample characteristics are

summarized in Table 1. The majority of participants were female (75.30%) and the average age
of the participants was 70.18 years. Most participants were retired, though 18.30% are currently
working part-time and 9.70% are currently working full-time. Approximately 44% of the sample
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was Caucasian and 49% was African-American. The average education of the participants was
approximately 15 years.

53.80% of the participants denied a family history of dementia.

46.20% of the participants acknowledged a history of dementia or Alzheimer’s disease in at least
one blood relative. 24.70% also endorsed a history of caregiving, either professionally or
personally, for someone with Alzheimer’s disease or dementia.
The sample was also stratified by family history of dementia.

Groups were compared

via independent samples t-tests or chi-squared tests of significance to determine whether they
differed in terms of demographic characteristics. Groups were not significantly different in
terms of age (t(90) = 1.18, p = .241, Cohen’s d = 0.244) or education (t(90) = 0.024, p = .982,
Cohen’s d = -0.004). Groups were also not significantly different in terms of gender (χ2(1) =
0.40, p = .627, Cramer’s V = 0.065), race (χ2(3) = 1.84, p = .796), or employment status (Fisher’s
Exact(2) = 3.05, p = .211, Cramer’s V = 0.186).
Measures
Baseline Cognitive Functioning. In order to assess whether groups were equivalent in
baseline intellectual functioning, all participants completed the Salthouse Synonym and
Antonym Vocabulary tests and the Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status.
The Salthouse Synonym and Antonym Vocabulary Test (Salthouse, 1993).

The

Salthouse Synonym Vocabulary Test includes ten uncommon words. The respondent must
choose the best synonym for each word from five provided options. The Salthouse Antonym
Vocabulary Test (Salthouse, 1993) includes ten different words, to which respondents must
match the best antonym from five options. The score for each test is the number of items
answered correctly. The range in scores on the combination of the tests is 0 to 20, with higher
scores denoting greater verbal abilities. The Synonym and Antonym vocabulary test has been
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used as a proxy measure of general cognitive functioning, as verbal abilities are strongly
correlated with overall IQ (Bowles & Salthouse, 2008).
Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status (TICS; Brandt & Folstein) – the TICS is a
standardized measure of general cognitive ability designed to be given in situations in which
face-to-face assessment would be impossible or inefficient. The measure includes eleven items
that are summed to yield a total ability score. Test developers have suggested that the TICS
correlates strongly with the MMSE and its scores have demonstrated high test-retest reliability
for the detection of cognitive impairment in older adults age 60 to 98 years. Further studies of
the psychometric properties of the TICS and the TICS-Modified have suggested that TICS scores
validly assess cognitive functioning in Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias (Duff, Dennett,
& Tometich, 2012) as well as amnestic mild cognitive impairment (Cook, Marsiske, & McCoy,
2009). Furthermore, TICS scores correlate highly with scores from several indices from a
comprehensive neuropsychological assessment, including verbal memory (Rey Auditory Verbal
Learning Test), orientation and mental tracking, fluency (category and animal naming), abstract
reasoning (Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices), and attention and executive functioning
(Stroop Color-Word Test, Trail-Making Test), and working memory (WAIS-III Digit Span
subtest; van den Berg, Ruis, Biessels, Kappelle, & van Zandvoort, 2012).
Negative Affect.

Negative affect, including general anxiety and depression, was

assessed using multiple measures.
Geriatric Depression Scale - Short Form (GDS-SF; Sheikh & Yesavage, 1986). The
short form of the GDS contains 15 phrases relating to symptoms of depression that older adults
might have. The respondent is required to respond either “yes” or “no” based on whether the
phrase describes how they have been feeling during the week prior to the assessment. Scores on
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the GDS-SF range from 0 to 15, with a score equal to or greater than five suggesting the
presence of depression. The short form of the GDS has been shown to have roughly equivalent
specificity and sensitivity in the diagnosis of depression in older adults as compared to the long
form of the GDS (Lesher & Berryhill, 1994). Older adults’ scores on the long and short version
of the GDS are also strongly correlated (r = .66, p < .01; Alden, Austin & Sturgeon, 1989).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults (STAI-Y; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene,
Vagg & Jacobs, 1983). The STAI-Y is a measure of self-reported anxiety symptoms. The
STAI-Y is divided into two subscales: State and Trait. The STAI-State subscale measures
anxious feelings at the time of the assessment. The STAI-Trait subscale measures chronic
anxious symptoms present across situations. The measure is often used to distinguish anxious
symptoms from depressed symptoms or to differentiate situational anxiety from trait level
anxiety.
The STAI-Y consists of two sets of 20 statements, with one set asking the respondent
about current symptoms (STAI-Y1; ex. “I feel calm.”) and a second set asking the respondent
about general symptoms (STAI-Y2; ex. “I am “calm, cool, and collected”.”). The respondent
scores each item on a four-point Likert-style scale, with 1 = “Almost Always” and 4 = “Almost
Never.” The scores possible on each subscale range from 20 to 80, with higher scores denoting
greater anxiety.
Scores from the STAI-Y have demonstrated reliability and validity for the assessment of
trait and state anxiety in older adults. The test-retest reliability for STAI-Y scores may range
from 0.31 to 0.86 using intervals of one to 104 days (Julian, 2011). As one might expect, the
test-retest reliability for the state anxiety subscale of the STAI is much lower than for the trait
anxiety subscale. Although little is known about the internal consistency of STAI scores when
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used with older adults, previous research has shown that the STAI alpha coefficients may range
from 0.86 for high school students to 0.95 for military recruits (Julian, 2011). STAI-Y scores
have also been shown to share strong correlations with other measures of anxiety, indicating that
it has construct validity (Julian, 2011). Recently, STAI-Y scores have demonstrated strong
reliability and validity for the assessment of state (Potvin et al., 2011) and trait (Bergua et al.,
2012) anxiety in adults over the age of 65 years.
Fear of Alzheimer’s Disease.

To assess each participant’s level of anticipatory

dementia and to validate the construct itself, several measures were used, including a novel
measure aimed to tap into the broader construct of FAD.
Fear of Alzheimer’s Disease Scale (FADS; French, Floyd, Wilkins & Osato, 2011).
The FADS is a self-report measure that taps into three facets of FAD: general fear, physiological
symptoms accompanying FAD, and catastrophic attitudes associated with FAD. Scores from the
scale have been validated for the assessment of these facets of anticipatory dementia in adults
age 65 to 91 (French et al., 2011). It includes 30 statements to which respondents indicate their
level of agreement on a five-point Likert-style scale ranging from “never” to “always.” Higher
scores on the scale denote greater fear of developing Alzheimer’s disease. Scores from the
General Fear, Physical Symptoms, and Catastrophic Attitudes factors had Cronbach’s alpha
coefficients of .94, .87, and .80, respectively, in adults over age 65 years. The overall internal
consistency coefficient of scores from the measure was .91, indicating acceptable reliability for
research and clinical use in this context (French, 2011). FADS scores also demonstrated
excellent construct validity and showed correlations with the total score on the STAI. However,
stronger correlations were observed with the STAI trait subscale score (French, 2011).
Cutler & Hodgson (2001) Single Item Assessment. Previous studies have measured
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FAD using a single question. In order to assess construct validity, the following item was also
asked: “I would like to ask how concerned you are about personally developing Alzheimer’s
disease. Would you say that you are very concerned, somewhat concerned, not very concerned,
or not at all concerned?” Although the reliability of this single-item measure cannot be assessed,
responses to the question have shown validity in the assessment of older adults’ personal
concerns about AD. Cutler and Hodgson (2001) suggest that there is significant shared variance
between worries about memory functioning, family history of AD, and FAD development.
Anticipatory Dementia Inventory (ADI). – The ADI is a novel measure of FAD designed
for the purpose of this study. The ADI includes 50 statements regarding six different facets of
FAD, each of which maps onto a part of the HBM (see Figure 1). Personal susceptibility is
measured by (1) beliefs about normal vs. AD-related forgetting, (2) beliefs about the prevalence
and etiology of AD, and (3) beliefs about personal likelihood of developing the disorder.
Perceived seriousness of AD is assessed in terms of (4) immediate consequences (the physical
and emotional symptoms experienced when thinking about AD), and (5) specific fears about AD
sequelae (e.g., loss of independence, loss of relationships, physical pain). Outcome expectations
about AD will be assessed in statements related to (6) beliefs about availability and efficacy of
treatments/preventative lifestyle changes to slow or stop AD progression. Respondents rate each
of the items for agreement on a five-point Likert-style scale. 0 = “strongly disagree”, 1 =
“somewhat disagree”, 2 = “neutral – do not agree or disagree”, 3 = “somewhat agree”, and 4 =
“strongly agree.” Higher scores on the ADI denote greater anticipatory dementia or fear of
Alzheimer’s disease. The measure is included in Appendix A.
Subjective Memory Complaints. Self-reported memory difficulties were assessed using
the Memory Functioning Questionnaire.
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Memory Functioning Questionnaire (MFQ; Gilewski, Zelinski, & Schaie, 1990). The
MFQ is a self-report measure used to assess how respondents perceive the frequency and
severity of their memory problems, as well as compensatory strategies. The present study will
utilize only the General Frequency of Forgetting scale (Frequency). The Frequency scale asks
the respondent to rate how often they have difficulty remembering types of information (ex.
names, faces, appointments). Each item is rated on a 7-point scale, with 1 = “Always” and 7 =
Never.” Scores on the MFQ Frequency scale range from 18 to 126, with lower scores suggesting
greater frequency of perceived memory failures.
Gilewski, Zelinski and Schaie (1990) have found evidence that the four subscales of the
MFQ, including the General Frequency of Forgetting scale, are a valid assessment of perceived
memory functioning in adults age 16 to 89. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for scores from the
Frequency subscale, in particular, is .94, suggesting high reliability (Gilewski, Zelinski, and
Schaie, 1990).
Objective Memory Functioning and Metamemory. Objective memory functioning
was assessed using a verbal list-learning task. The lists used in the current task were drawn from
a prior study of verbal learning and recall (Woodard, 1991; see Appendix B). These 20-word
lists were selected because items on the lists were matched for item difficulty, syllable length,
and semantic and phonemic relatedness. The length of the word list was chosen to reduce the
likelihood of ceiling effects and provide a task sufficiently challenging to encourage purposeful
use of memory strategies by participants.
Words are presented visually using E-prime ®, Version 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools,
Inc.). All words were presented in large Arial font, in the center of the screen. Computer
conditions were regulated to maximize reliability of word presentation across participants; a
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dedicated laptop (2015 HP 15-f133wm with Intel Celeron N2840 Processor, 4GB Memory,
500GB Hard Drive, 15.6-inch screen diameter, Windows version 8.1), devoid of self-updating
programs, the Internet, or anti-virus software that may interfere with task presentation or data
recording, was used. Due to varying participant height, the angle of the computer was not
standard; instead, efforts were made to have all participants seated comfortably, with the
computer placed 18 to 24 inches away and the screen faced directly at them. Participants were
seated away from windows to reduce screen glare. All instructions were provided visually and
read to the participant, verbatim.
Condition 1: Computer-Paced Memory and JOL Task.

In the computer-paced

condition, 20 words are presented at a standard pace. The examiner begins by explaining that 20
words will be presented visually at a rate of one word every two seconds, and that the participant
must try to remember as many words as possible so that he or she can recall them, in any order,
after the list is presented. Prior to the list presentation, the examiner asks for an initial judgment
of learning estimate to determine the participant’s rating of their memory without behavioral
feedback. The list is then presented at the center of the computer screen. Directly after the final
word has been presented, the examiner asks for a judgment of learning estimate from the
participant (“Of the 20 words you just saw, how many do you think you can remember now?”).
As soon as the participant has given a JOL appraisal, the examiner prompts the participant to
recall, out loud, as many of the words he or she can remember in any order. The participant is
allowed up to 60 seconds to recall as many words as possible, with no corrections for repetition
or feedback about accuracy. After completion of the recall trial, the participant completes two
more repetitions of the above procedure for a total of three trials. The resulting data provides
four JOL estimates and accuracy across trials, as well as information about learning and memory.
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Condition 2: Self-Paced Memory and JOL Task. In the self-paced list-learning
condition, participants can vary the amount of time that they use to study the list of 20 words in
order to maximize the number of words recalled. In the present study, metacognitive control is
operationalized as amount of study time allocated to each item. The procedure for the self-paced
condition mirrors the procedure in the computer-paced condition, with the exception of how
word lists are paced. When the list is presented, the participant is given up to 10-seconds to study
each word on the list, but can press a key to manually move on to the next word at any time. The
participant can therefore shorten or lengthen their study time based on their assessment of task
difficulty and memory ability. As in the computer-paced task, participants complete one JOL
estimate prior to list presentation, then three presentation and recall trials, making a JOL estimate
after each list presentation and before each 60-second recall trial.
Procedure
All interested individuals underwent a telephone screening to determine their eligibility
for the study. Prior to this screen, participants provided verbal consent for recording of their
responses. During the phone screen, participants were asked questions about their health and
given the Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status to assess whether they were cognitively
intact. Those individuals who met criteria for participation in the study were also asked to
complete Cutler and Hodgson’s single-item question about their level of FAD. Participants in
the study were scheduled for an hour-and-a-half appointment to participate individually or in
pairs. Testing was completed at the WSU research laboratory, the WSU IOG, or at a public
library of their choice. All testing at public libraries was completed in private study rooms.
Efforts were made to complete testing in only quiet, noise-controlled environments with
adequate lighting to minimize computer glare. All individuals were asked to provide informed
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consent before participation.
Questionnaires and Measures. Participants completed the Salthouse Synonym and
Antonym Vocabulary tests, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, the MFQ Frequency Subscale, the
FADS, and the ADI separately from the objective memory and metacognitive monitoring and
control tasks.
It was thought that participants might be more anxious about their memory functioning
after completing the questionnaires about memory concerns and fear of developing AD. This
anxiety was expected to drive poorer performance on recall trials and underestimated or unusual
JOL appraisals. Similarly, it was suggested that participants who had just undergone challenging
memory tasks would over-estimate their concern about AD or memory-related worry. In order
to control for the possibility of sensitization by task order, the order of the questionnaires and
memory tasks was counter-balanced, with participants randomly assigned to receive either the
questionnaires or the memory task first.
For participants with visual impairments, questionnaires with small print were read aloud
by the examiner. The total time for participation was between 45 and 90 minutes. Participants
were compensated with $20 in cash.
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS
Specific Aim 1
To validate FAD as a construct, the relationship between FAD and related constructs was
assessed.

First, independent samples t-tests were calculated to determine whether group

differences exist on FAD measures based on family history. As data regarding caregiving was
also available, FAD measure group means were also compared for individuals who had and had
not reported a history of caregiving for someone with dementia. Pearson’s r and Kendall’s Taub correlations were computed to determine the relationship between FAD measures and the MFQ
Frequency Subscale (subjective memory complaints; hypothesis b) and the STAI-State, STAITrait, and GDS scales (general negative affect; hypothesis c). To assess the relationship between
FAD and metacognitive monitoring (hypothesis d), Pearson’s r or Kendall’s Tau-b correlations
were calculated between FAD and JOL estimate score across all list-learning trials.

A

Bonferroni correction for familywise error was implemented.
Multiple regression was used to address hypothesis (e) of Specific Aim 1 – that negative
affect, SMCs, and metacognitive monitoring account for a relatively small amount of variance in
FAD. FAD was regressed onto STAI-State and Trait subscales, GDS, MFQ Frequency of
Forgetting score, and JOL estimate summary scores simultaneously.

The amount of variance

unaccounted for (1-R2) reflects the amount of residual variance in FAD not explained by other
factors.
To address the final hypothesis (f) of Specific Aim 1, the Anticipatory Dementia
Checklist (ADI) will be developed and analyzed.

As previously mentioned, the ADI was

developed to assess facets of FAD that map onto the Health Belief Model (HBM; Rosenstock,
Stretcher and Becker, 1988) including beliefs about general and personal susceptibility to AD,
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health and AD-specific locus of control, and knowledge about preventative and prescriptive
treatments for AD. An initial pool of 50 questions was created by developing AD-specific items
related to each component of the HBM (perceived susceptibility to AD, perceived seriousness of
having AD, perceived barriers and benefits to taking action against AD development; see Figure
1).

Items were created on a Likert-style bipolar scale, ranging from “Strongly Agree” to

“Strongly Disagree.”
To assess construct validity, the correlations shared between different measures of FAD
(Cutler & Hodgson single item question, FADS and ADI) were determined. Kendall’s Tau-b
correlations were calculated for all analyses involving the Cutler and Hodgson single item.
Pearson’s r correlations were computed for all other associations.
Although comprehensive scale validation is not possible with this limited sample size,
scale validation procedures were used to make initial estimates of the ADI’s internal consistency
and factor structure. Cronbach’s alpha was calculated to determine the internal consistency of
the scale items. A principal components analysis was used to determine the independent facets
of FAD assessed by the ADI.

Item factor loadings were qualitatively and quantitatively

reviewed to characterize each significant component.
Specific Aim 2
The second specific aim focuses on understanding which of the metacognitive variables
utilized in this study might account for significant proportions of variance in objective memory
functioning.

To address hypotheses (a) and (b) of Specific Aim 2, Kendall’s Tau-b and

Pearson’s r correlations were calculated between total number of items recalled across all selfpaced list-learning trials and each of the metacognitive variables: MFQ-Frequency subscale
scores (SMCs), FADS, ADI and Cutler & Hodgson’s single item scores (FAD), JOL estimate
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summary score (metacognitive monitoring), and study time differences between computer-paced
versus self-paced tasks (metacognitive control). A Bonferroni correction for family-wise error
was implemented.
To address hypothesis (c) of Specific Aim 2, the relative proportion of variance in
objective memory functioning accounted for by each of the metacognitive variables was assessed
using multiple regression. Two regression equations were created to explain composite memory
scores across all self-paced trials and computer-paced trials, separately.

MFQ-Frequency

subscale scores, FADS, ADI and Cutler & Hodgson’s single item scores, JOL estimate summary
score, and study time differences between computer- versus self-paced tasks were entered
simultaneously.

The squared semi-partial correlations of each predictor were evaluated to

determine the relative unique contributions of each metacognitive variable to the overall model.
Specific Aim 3
The final objective of the study aimed to investigate the relationship between FAD and
metacognitive monitoring and control.

First, metacognitive monitoring was compared to

metacognitive control through calculation of Pearson’s r correlations between JOL estimates
from self-paced tasks and study time on subsequent trials (Hypothesis a). Kendall’s Tau-b and
Pearson’s r correlations were calculated to estimate the relationship between FAD measures
(FADS, ADI, and the Cutler & Hodgson single item) and metacognitive monitoring accuracy
(the absolute value of JOL resolution). Kendall’s Tau-b and Pearson’s r correlations were also
calculated to estimate the relationship between FAD measures and metacognitive control
(average study time difference for computer-paced versus self-paced trials). Again, a Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons was implemented to correct for the proposed comparisons.
To address hypotheses (b) and (c) of Specific Aim 3, a continuous x continuous
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moderated multiple regression analysis was planned. A moderated multiple regression was to be
estimated for each of the measures of FAD. To assess whether the FADS scores moderates the
relationship between JOL estimates and study time changes, JOL estimate summary scores
across all trials and the interaction between JOL estimate and FADS were to be entered into a
regression equation to predict average study time difference between computer- and self-paced
trials. This analysis was to be repeated for each of the measures of anticipatory dementia.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
All analyses were performed using SPSS Version 22.0 (IBM Corporation, 2013).
Data Screening
Minimum and maximum values for each variable were assessed to ensure data entry
accuracy. A missing value analysis was completed using SPSS. All variables had less than or
equal to five percent missing data with the exception of the Memory Functioning Questionnaire,
General Memory Estimate (Question 1: “How would you rate your memory in terms of the kinds
of problems you have?”, 11.8% missing data), FADS Item 16 (“My hands become clammy when
I think about getting Alzheimer’s disease”; 6.5% missing data), and the Cutler & Hodgson FAD
Question (63.4% missing data). Due to the high proportion of missing data, which appeared to
occur because of a misprint in test packets, the Cutler and Hodgson FAD question was removed
from further analyses. Cases with and without missing data on these variables were dummy
coded and compared to assess for patterns of missing data. No patterns emerged from these
analyses; therefore, data were determined to be missing at random. Rather, observations of
participants’ files suggest that items were skipped because of their placement on questionnaire
pages or because of difficulty reading the item.
Frequency tables were created for each variable to assess the distribution of the data. To
determine whether univariate outliers existed in the dataset, all continuous variables were
converted into z-scores and compared against a cutoff of z ± 3.29, which reflects an alpha level
of α = .001. Two univariate outliers were detected: a single outlier for computer-paced JOL
resolution (Case #208; z = 3.31), and a single outlier for self-paced JOL resolution (Case #110; z
= -3.69). No other univariate outliers were detected in the dataset. In order to assess for the
presence of multivariate outliers, the 14 outcome variables of interest were entered into a
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regression to calculate Mahalanobis’ distance. Using a chi-squared cut-off of χ2(13) = 36.123
consistent with an alpha level of α = .001, only two multivariate outliers were detected: Case
#233 (Mahalanobis’ distance = 53.685), and Case 150 (Mahalanobis’ distance = 39.262). Given
the limited number of univariate and multivariate outliers, it was not considered necessary to
perform a discriminant function analysis to assess differences in these cases.

Cases were

inspected individually to determine if they possessed unique characteristics compared to the rest
of the data; they were demographically similar to other cases.
The outcome variables of interest were also assessed for normality. The distribution of
data for each variable was evaluated visually using Q-Q plots. The skewness and kurtosis index
of each variable was also calculated. Variables were classified as not skewed, moderately
skewed, substantially skewed, and not kurtotic, moderately kurtotic, and substantially kurtotic
using this information (see Table 2). Although some variables were significantly skewed or
kurtotic, these measures represent phenomena that are not expected to be normally distributed in
the population; therefore, no transformation was completed to adjust these variables.
Demographically Corrected Outcome Measures
Age was not significantly associated with measures of FAD. It was not significantly
associated with scores on the measures of negative affect. Age was associated with objective
memory performance, as evidenced by significant correlations between age and Trial 1 score
(r(90) = -.414, p < .001), Trial 2 score (r(90) = -.451, p < .001), Trial 3 score (r(90) = -.389, p < .001)
and total score (r(90) = -.468, p < .001) in the computer-paced condition and Trial 1 score (r(90) = .221 , p = .035), Trial 2 score (r(90) = -.309 , p = .003), Trial 3 score (r(90) = -.316, p = .002) and
total score (r(90) = -.311, p = .003) in the self-paced condition. Interestingly, age was associated
with accuracy of the JOL estimate (resolution) on computer-paced Trial 1 (r(90) = -.212, p =
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.042), computer-paced Trial 2 (r(90) = -.245, p = .019), and across computer-paced trials (r(90) = .219, p = .036), but was not associated with JOL resolution on any self-paced trials.
Education did not share a significant relationship with any measures of FAD or negative
affect. Education was significantly associated with performance on self-paced Trial 1 (r(90) =
.260, p = .012), Trial 2 (r(90) = .270, p = .009), and Trial 3 (r(90) = .311, p = .003), and across selfpaced trials (r(90) = .302, p = .003), but was not associated with objective memory functioning in
the computer-paced trial. Education was also significantly associated with the JOL estimate on
self-paced Trial 2 (r(90) = .223, p = .032) and Trial 3 (r(90) = .205, p = .049). Education shared a
significant relationship with JOL resolution on computer-paced Trial 1 (r(90) = .215, p = .039)
and overall (r(90) = .209, p = .045). Finally, education was significantly associated with the
difference in number of items recalled on self-paced Trial 2 compared to computer-paced Trial 2
(r(90) = .222, p = .033). Similarly, education was significantly associated with the difference in
self-paced Trial 3 score versus computer-paced Trial 3 score (r(90) = .312, p = .002), and overall
difference between self- and computer-paced task scores (r(90) = .298, p = .039).
Given that age and education were correlated with the many of the outcome measures of
interest in the study, demographically corrected scores were computed. This correction was
accomplished by regressing the outcome measures onto age and education and saving the
resulting standardized residuals.

These demographically corrected scores were used in

subsequent analyses.
Specific Aim (1)
Individuals with and without a family history of dementia do not differ on FAD
(Hypothesis a). Independent samples t-tests revealed that there were no significant difference
between individuals with or without family history of dementia on FADS score (t(89) = -1.29, p =
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.201, Cohen’s d = 0.28) or ADI score (t(89) = -0.61, p = .546, Cohen’s d = 0.13). No significant
differences existed between individuals with and without history of caregiving for someone with
dementia on the FADS score (t(89) = -0.80, p = .425, Cohen’s d = 0.17) or ADI score (t(89) = 0.97, p = .337, Cohen’s d = 0.21, ES = .10). Results are summarized in Table 3.
Higher FAD is associated with more subjective memory complaints (Hypothesis b).
Pearson’s r correlations were calculated to determine the relationship between measures of FAD
and subjective memory complaints (MFQ total score).

Given that two comparisons were

calculated to address this hypothesis, a Bonferroni correction for family-wise error was
implemented, resulting in a significance level of α = 2.50E-2. Scores on the FADS were
significantly negatively associated with self-reported quality of memory on the MFQ (r(88) = -.44,
p < .001). Scores on the ADI were also significantly negatively associated with MFQ total
scores (r(88) = -.33, p = .002). Results are summarized in Table 4.
FAD is positively associated with depressive symptoms and trait anxiety (Hypothesis
c). Pearson’s r correlations were calculated to determine the relationship between measures of
FAD and Anxiety (STAI-State and STAI-Trait, GDS total score). Given that eight comparisons
were calculated to address this hypothesis, a Bonferroni correction for family-wise error was
implemented, resulting in a significance level of α = 6.25E-3. Both the FADS score and the ADI
score were significantly positively associated with State Anxiety at the α = .05 level, but not at
the Bonferroni-corrected level of significance. FADS score was significantly associated with
Trait Anxiety at the α = .05 level, but not at the Bonferroni-corrected level of significance;
however, scores on the ADI shared a significant positive relationship with Trait Anxiety at this
corrected level (r(88) = .248, p = .002). Finally, both the FADS (r(88) = .214, p = .003) and the
ADI (r(88) = .287, p < .001) were positively associated with depressive symptoms.

These
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findings are also included in Table 4.
FAD is not associated with metacognitive monitoring or resolution (Hypothesis d).
Pearson’s r correlations were calculated to determine the relationship between measures of FAD
versus JOL estimates and resolution (see Tables 5 and 6). A Bonferroni correction was used to
account for the 32 total comparisons made to address this hypothesis, resulting in a significance
level of p < 1.56E-3. No measures of FAD were significantly related to any JOL estimate or the
resolution of any JOL estimate on computer- or self-paced trials. These findings do not differ
when examining family history positive and family history negative groups in isolation.
Subjective memory complaints, negative affect, and metacognitive monitoring
account for a relatively small amount of variance in FAD (Hypothesis e).

Because

correlations indicated no significant relationship between measures of FAD and JOL appraisals
or accuracy, metacognitive monitoring variables were excluded from analyses for this
hypothesis. Separate multiple regression equations were calculated for the FADS and ADI score,
entering MFQ total score, GDS score, STAI State and STAI Trait subscale scores
simultaneously. 1-R2 was used to assess the amount of residual variance in the FAD measure
unaccounted for by other measures of anticipatory dementia. Subjective memory complaints and
negative affect accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in FADS scores (R2 = .269,
F(4) = 7.83, p < .001), but 73.1% of the variance in FADS scores was not accounted for by these
predictors.

Similarly, subjective memory complaints and negative affect accounted for a

significant proportion of the variance in ADI scores (R2 = .273, F(4) = 7.97, p < .001), but 72.7%
of the variance in ADI scores was not accounted for by these predictors.
The ADI is related to other measures of FAD, but it also taps into other aspects of
Alzheimer’s disease fear not measured by existing instruments (Hypothesis f). First, a
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Pearson’s r correlation was calculated to assess the relationship between the ADI and the FADS.
The ADI was significantly positively associated with the FADS score at the Bonferroni-corrected
level of significance (r(86) = .697, p < .001). The FADS score accounted for 48.6% of the
variance in the ADI score, but approximately 51.4% of variance in the ADI score was unique.
Internal consistency of ADI scores was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach’s
alpha of the scale was α = .896, indicating a level of reliability adequate for both clinical and
experimental use. An assessment of the Cronbach’s alpha with item deletion indicated that
reliability of the scale would not significantly differ with deletion of any single item.
For the purpose of exploring the potential components in the scale for future directions, a
principal components analysis (PCA) using an orthogonal Varimax rotation was conducted. An
initial assessment of the extractions showed that all components were significantly associated,
with no extraction residuals <.512. Using an eigenvalue of greater or equal to 1 as cutoff for
significance, 14 components were extracted. This solution would account for 75.35% of the
variance in the measure. The 14-component solution resulted in 15% (194) residuals with
absolute values greater than .05, indicating that this solution may not adequately capture the
variance in the measure. Alternatively, a visual examination of the scree plot for the PCA (see
Figure 2), indicate that a five-component solution may be more appropriate. This solution
accounts for 47.87% of the variance in the measure. A parallel analysis was completed to
determine the number of components to retain, based on the method suggested by O’Connor
(2000). Parallel analysis uses the current study’s sample size, number of variables in the PCA,
and other parameters set by the researcher to calculate eigenvalues from randomly generated
correlation matrices.

These generated values were then compared to eigenvalues of the

components extracted in the principal components analysis detailed above. The number of
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components retained from the PCA are those components with eigenvalues greater than the
corresponding random eigenvalues.

Based on this method, a total of six factors should be

retained for further analysis. This solution accounts for 52.48% of variance in the ADI. These
data are summarized in Table 7.
A qualitative analysis was performed to determine the content of each potential
component (see Table 8). The first component is related to overall negative affect at the thought
of developing AD (e.g., “Thinking about getting AD makes me feel angry.”), as well as specific
worries about AD (e.g., “I worry that I will be a burden on my family if I develop AD.”). The
second component relates to physical symptoms associated with fear of AD (e.g., “When I think
about AD, my stomach is in knots or I feel nauseated.”). The third component appears to assess
the belief in efficacy of treatments for AD (e.g., “If I am diagnosed with AD, there is nothing
doctors will be able to do to improve my outcomes.”). The fourth component appears to tap into
belief in personal vulnerability to AD (e.g., “I believe that I am going to develop AD.”). The
fifth component appears to assess beliefs in self-efficacy in reducing the likelihood of developing
AD (e.g., “I can reduce my chances of developing AD by using my brain in new ways, like doing
crossword puzzles, Sudoku, or reading.”). Items in the final component tap into resilience to
worry about AD (“Thinking about AD does not make me worry.”). Other components were less
defined.
Specific Aim (2)
Given the 48 comparisons completed for this aim, a Bonferroni-corrected significance
level of 1.04E-3 was used.
Metacognitive control is positively associated with objective memory performance,
but subjective memory complaints and FAD are not (Hypothesis a). Pearson’s r correlations
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were calculated to determine the relationship between MFQ scores, FAD measures, study time
differences in the self-paced condition, and objective memory functioning across computer- and
self-paced trials.

As indicated in Table 9, subjective memory complaints and anticipatory

dementia measures were not significantly associated with objective memory functioning on any
computer- or self-paced trial, or across trials. However, total study time difference between selfpaced and computer-paced trials was significantly associated with performance on self-paced
Trial 1 (r(89) = .379, p <. 001) and with the self-paced trials total score (r(89) = .345, p < .001) at
the Bonferroni-corrected level of significance.
Metacognitive monitoring is positively associated with objective memory
performance (Hypothesis b).

To address this hypothesis, Pearson’s r correlations were

calculated. Results are also summarized in Table 9. The total JOL estimate across all computerpaced trials was significantly positively associated with objective memory performance on
computer-paced Trial 2 (r(90) = .407, p < .001) and with performance across all computer-paced
trials (r(90) = .396, p < .001). In contrast, the total JOL estimate across all self-paced trials was
significant positively associated with performance on computer-paced Trial 2 (r(90) = .492, p <
.001), computer-paced Trial 3 (r(90) = .472, p < .001), computer-paced trials total (r(90) = .509, p <
.001), self-paced Trial 1 (r(90) = .436, p < .001), self-paced Trial 2 (r(90) = .530, p < .001), Trial 3
(r(90) = .504, p < .001), and self-paced trials total (r(90) = .526, p < .001).
Among metacognitive variables, metacognitive monitoring accounts for the greatest
amount of variance in objective memory functioning (Hypothesis c). To address Hypothesis
(c), MFQ total score, FADS total score, ADI total score, JOL estimates across all computerpaced trials, JOL estimates across all self-paced trials, and study time differences between selfand computer-paced trials were entered simultaneously into a regression equation to account for
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variance in objective memory functioning. These measures were regressed onto computer-paced
objective memory functioning and self-paced objective memory functioning separately. The
results are summarized in Table 10. The squared semi-partial correlations were then assessed to
determine the unique proportion of variance in the outcome accounted for by each of the
metacognitive variables. Self-paced JOL estimates accounted for the highest proportion of
unique variance in memory performance on computer-paced trials (12.53%, t = 3.825, p < .001)
and self-paced trials (19.27%, t = 5.00, p < .001). Metacognitive control also accounted for a
significant proportion of variance in computer-paced memory performance (4.37%, t = -2.256, p
= .027), and self-paced memory performance (4.41%, t = 2.389, p = .019). None of the other
metacognitive variables accounted for significant unique variance in objective memory
functioning.
Specific Aim (3)
Metacognitive monitoring during self-paced trials is associated with metacognitive
control (Hypothesis a). To assess this aim, Pearson’s r correlations between JOL estimates for
individual trials and across trials in the two conditions and study time differences were examined
(see Table 11). Metacognitive monitoring was not significantly associated with metacognitive
control on any of the computer-paced trials.

In contrast, study time differences were

significantly positively associated with JOL estimates on self-paced Trial 3 (r(89) = .248, p =
.018) and across all self-paced trials (r(89) = .226, p = .031).
FAD is not associated with metacognitive monitoring, and it does not impact
metacognitive control (Hypotheses b and c). Because none of the FAD measures were
significantly associated with any of the JOL estimates, JOL resolutions, or study time
differences, Hypothesis (b) was not analyzed further.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION
The present study investigated a common problem among the ‘worried well’ population
of middle- and older-aged adults: Fear of Alzheimer’s disease. The study provided further
evidence of the shared variance between FAD and emotional constructs, including depression
and trait-level negative affect. The study also examined the relationship between FAD and
cognitive constructs, such as general subjective memory complaints, task-specific metacognitive
monitoring and control, and actual memory performance.

Results indicate that FAD may

constitute perceptual and emotional experiences, as opposed to a cognitive phenomenon, as it is
not linked to ability to accurately monitor one’s performance, ability to change behavior to
improve performance, or objective recall ability. Finally, the study introduced a new, theorydriven approach to assessing FAD: the Anticipatory Dementia Inventory.
Results indicated that, contrary to prior research (Cutler & Hodgson, 1996; 2001; Roberts
& Connell, 2000; Cantegreil-Kallen & Pin, 2012; Leon et al., 2015), individuals with a family
history of dementia or of caregiving for individuals with dementia did not report a higher level of
FAD. These findings may be explained by the relatively older sample assessed in the study,
whose mean age was approximately 69 years. Although almost equal numbers of participants
with and without a family history of AD were included, this family history was self-reported and
largely based on participants’ perception, rather than on formal diagnosis of a parent with
dementia. Many participants attributed their lack of knowledge of specific dementia diagnosis to
the fact that knowledge of Alzheimer’s disease was more limited and formal diagnosis of
dementia, let alone AD, was much less common when their parents were aging. Furthermore,
anecdotal evidence from most family history positive participants indicated that parents with
dementia often died early in their disease course, which may have lessened participants’ fear-
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producing experiences with AD. The relatively older age of the sample may also have been
associated with reduced FAD; older participants may have surpassed the perceived age of onset
of AD, thereby lessening their level of fear. The finding that caregiving for AD is not associated
with FAD, which also contradicts prior literature, may be accounted for by the fact that most
caregiving positive participants reported doing so only professionally.

Individuals whose

occupation involved caregiving may have more accurate perceptions about AD prevalence and
treatments, as well as greater self-efficacy with health behaviors, both of which would reduce
FAD. Furthermore, a recent study proposed that proximity to AD through caregiving or family
history may be a predictor of level of FAD only in younger to middle-aged adults (CantegreilKallen & Pin, 2012).

Nonetheless, the finding challenges the role of family history and

caregiving in developing a ‘worried well’ presentation. While these experiences may contribute
to perceived personal vulnerability to AD, neither family history nor personal exposure to AD
independently produce concern that one will develop AD.

Other characteristics, such as

resilience to FAD, belief in treatments, or self-efficacy, may balance out the effect of family or
caregiving history.
The current study corroborated prior findings (Cutler & Hodgson, 1996; 2001) that
anticipatory dementia is associated with greater subjective memory complaints. However, the
hypothesis that FAD would also be negatively associated with metacognitive monitoring was not
supported. The number of items participants expected to recall across trials was the same,
regardless of FAD level. This finding could be explained if all participants were providing
similar, low estimates of performance, but only individuals high in FAD were accurately rating
their poor performance.

However, FAD also had no effect on metacognitive resolution,

suggesting that individuals who are more fearful are no less accurate at rating their memory of a
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list of words than those who are less fearful. Similarly, FAD level was not associated with
scores on measures of overall cognitive functioning (TICS, Synonym or Antonym Vocabulary
Tests), or with memory performance.
The above findings collectively differentiate subjective memory complaints from taskspecific memory ratings. Indeed, investigation of the relationship between subjective memory
complaints and metacognitive monitoring and resolution showed no significant association.
Although a healthy, non-impaired individual may accurately monitor his ability to learn and
remember information immediately and specifically to a memory task, an intervening process
may cause him to misperceive the accumulation of these ratings over time to yield subjective
memory complaints that drive FAD. Given the findings that FAD and subjective memory
complaints are associated with trait-level negative affect, it is likely that this intervening process
is affective in nature.
The association between subjective memory complaints and FAD, combined with the
lack of relationships between metacognition and FAD and objective memory functioning and
FAD provides support for the stereotype threat theory of FAD development. FAD may be
interpreted as a failure to engage in task-specific metacognitive monitoring on a daily basis and,
instead, an expectation of memory failure that increases anxiety, reduces attentional resources,
and provides the individual with perceived ‘evidence’ that their memory is actually failing.
The study replicated prior findings that subjective memory complaints were not tied to
objective memory performance (Jungwirth et al., 2004; Ponds, Van Boxtel, & Jolles, 2000;
Lenehan, Klekociuk, & Summers, 2012). Given the hypothesized relationship between SMCs
and FAD, it is not surprising that FAD is also not associated with memory functioning.
However, this conclusion does highlight that FAD is based neither on actual memory failures,
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nor an accurate appraisal of memory. Conversely, metacognitive monitoring was significantly
associated with objective memory performance. This finding again underlines that, regardless of
level of FAD, self-rating and performance should be related. An unexpected conclusion from the
analyses is the relationship between metacognitive control and memory performance on the selfpaced list-learning task. Participants who increased their study time were able to recall more
words.

Given the significant positive relationship between metacognitive monitoring and

control, this association emphasizes that, in a healthy sample, accurate metacognitive monitoring
can drive changes in behavior that can lead to improved performance.
In sum, the results of the present study point to a dissociation between more affectivelychanged self-rating processes (subjective memory complaints, FAD) and more cognitive
appraisals (metacognitive monitoring, resolution, and control). Although only the latter are
grounded in actual memory functioning, both task-specific and general memory ratings appear to
cause significant distress that may interfere with functioning in daily life.
A final goal of the study was to examine FAD through the Health Belief Model through
the development of the Anticipatory Dementia Index (ADI). While prior studies have examined
the symptoms of FAD using the Fear of Alzheimer’s Disease Scale (FADS; French, Floyd,
Wilkins & Osato, 2012; Moon, Kim, Hoi, Oh & Chan, 2014), these studies were limited in that
they could not identify potential targets for intervention to reduce FAD. As FAD accounts for
significant distress reported in large proportions of international samples (Anderson, Day, Beard,
Reed & Wu, 2009; Cantegreil-Kallen & Pin, 2012; Werner, 2002; Leon et al., 2015) and drives
change in health behaviors (Ramakers et al., 2009; Corner & Bond, 2004), a better understanding
of causes of the phenomenon was sought. The study supports the notion that FAD can be
examined through the lens of the Health Belief Model (Rosenstock et al., 1988).
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The Health Belief Model (Rosenstock et al., 1988) proposes that health beliefs and
behaviors are shaped not only by perceived threat of a disorder or problem, but also one’s
expectations for effectively reducing the threat. The primary component of FAD reflects overall
negative affect and specific concerns about AD.

This component maps cleanly onto the

‘Perceived Seriousness of Consequences’ aspect of the Health Belief Model (1988).

The

component is also most closely tied to other measures of FAD. Among specific concerns about
AD, fear of not being able to contribute to society (Item #49), fear of being a burden on one’s
family (Item #43), concern about loss of decision-making abilities (Item #42), and concern over
the financial burden of AD (Item #45) were most commonly endorsed by all participants,
regardless of FAD level. These items demonstrate that FAD is not simply concern over memory
loss or physical symptoms, but rather a concern over the larger impact of FAD on one’s place
within the family and society.
The second component of the ADI represents physical symptoms in response to these AD
concerns. It likely also shares a large proportion of variance with the FADS measure, which also
assesses physical reactions in FAD. Interestingly, very few participants endorsed the three major
items comprising this component, suggesting that even those individuals who are most fearful do
not experience sleep disturbances, shakiness or restlessness, or nausea in response to FAD. This
component would also fall under the ‘Perceived Seriousness of Consequences’ facet of the
Health Belief Model.
The fourth component of the ADI, which reflects personal vulnerability to AD,
constitutes to ‘Perceived Susceptibility’ facet of the Health Belief Model. Items 28 (“I believe
that I am going to develop AD”) and 23 (“I believe that I am already showing signs of AD.”)
were the most commonly endorsed of Component 4, but were endorsed only by the most fearful
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individuals. It was expected that other items related to perceptions of susceptibility to AD would
load onto this component or form additional components. Although loadings are relatively
lower, items from Components 9 through 12 represent beliefs about the normal versus abnormal
memory loss with aging and perceptions of the heritability of AD. Given that recent studies have
highlighted the importance of normative beliefs in FAD (Leon et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2015),
future iterations of the scale will revise these items to more clearly tap into these constructs, as
they constitute an important facet of FAD. In sum, Components 4, 9, 10, 11, and 12 likely
measure Perceived Susceptibility, Components 1 and 2 measure Perceived Seriousness of
Consequences, and all items in these components tap into some aspect of Perceived Threat of
AD.
The third and fifth components of the ADI represent into the Outcome Expectations facet
of the Health Belief Model. Items in Component 3 reflect belief in the efficacy of treatments for
AD. Item #4 (“If I am diagnosed with AD, there is nothing doctors will be able to do to improve
my outcomes.”) and #22 (“There are treatments that can slow or stop the progression of AD”;
reverse-scored) were most strongly endorsed by individuals high in FAD. These items represent
a mindset about the intractability of AD that would likely contribute to FAD.

The fifth

component assesses beliefs in one’s ability to effectively reduce risk for AD by changing
behavior. Somewhat unexpectedly, the two self-efficacy items most commonly endorsed tapped
into a belief that consuming a healthy diet (Item #12) and participating in social activities (Item
#15) were the best strategies to reduce AD risk, as compared to engaging in physical or
cognitively-stimulating activities.

Nonetheless, these items reflect an important target for

treatment of FAD. A recent review of a French public health intervention to decrease FAD
determined that inaccurate knowledge about the availability and efficacy of medical and
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behavioral interventions is a critical predictor of FAD (Leon et al., 2015).
The items of the final component tap into resilience against worry about AD (“Thinking
about AD does not make me worry.”), and it may be a gross measure of overall level of FAD
once Perceived Vulnerability, Perceived Seriousness of Consequences, and Outcome
Expectations are processed.
These results corroborate the findings of a recent qualitative Australian study in which
focus groups were interviewed to determine their knowledge of dementia risk factors and their
motivation to engage in lifestyle changes that would reduce the likelihood of dementia (Kim et
al., 2015). Although participants were able to list non-modifiable risk factors (age, genetics) and
modifiable risk factors (diet, exercise, mental stimulation, social activity), there were
considerable misperceptions about dementia as a normal part of aging and about relative benefit
of risk factors.

The study found evidence of three groups differing in level of perceived

susceptibility: a fearful group, who were unable to approach actually estimating their likelihood
of developing dementia because of their fear, a rational group, who reviewed their lifestyle and
risk factors (with variable accuracy) to produce an estimate of dementia risk, and a cynical
group, whose external locus of control drove them to estimate their chances of developing
dementia as random, based on luck or chance. Avoidance of dementia and death due to dementia
were the most commonly cited benefits of changing health behaviors, while limited education
was the most commonly cited barrier. These findings echo the early conclusions from the ADI.
The ADI may also be clinically useful as a measure of FAD that is more efficient than qualitative
focus group interviewing to identify public perception of AD.
Limitations
Although the study provided important, novel information about the construct of FAD, it
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was somewhat limited. The small sample size tested in this pilot study was not sufficient for true
scale development. Furthermore, the sample was community dwelling and cognitively intact.
Given these sample characteristics, relatively few individuals demonstrated high FAD. Future
studies should investigate a clinical sample that includes individuals with true memory
impairment and individuals whose concern is significant enough to warrant neuropsychological
or other medical evaluation. This more clinical sample will allow researchers to investigate the
convergent and discriminant validity between FAD and other constructs. A larger sample with a
revised scale would permit confirmatory factor analytic studies to further conceptualize FAD as
part of a health belief model.
Other characteristics of the sample may have also impacted FAD. The sample was
highly educated and relatively older. As previously mentioned, older adults may believe that the
older they are without a diagnosis of AD, the less likely they are to experience it (Kim et al.,
2015). More educated adults may also have more accurate perceptions of AD prevalence and
risk factors, lowering the overall level of FAD in the sample. Future studies should examine a
greater proportion of middle-aged adults, with more varied education.
Finally, it may be helpful to examine the relationship between FAD and metacognition
through a different metacognitive monitoring task. While the present study utilized a judgment
of learning task that required assessment of learning prior to recall, a feeling of knowing (FOK)
task, in which the participant rates how many items they recalled after the recall trial, may have
been more appropriate. Anecdotally, some participants rushed through the JOL estimates, as
they saw it as a distraction from working memory rehearsal of the final items on the list. If recall
had already occurred as in the FOK task, more effort and concentration might have been
allocated to the task of metacognitive monitoring, increasing the validity and reliability of these
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ratings.
Implications
The study presents many clinical implications.

The shared variance between FAD,

negative affect and subjective memory complaints, when compared to the lack of association
between FAD and metacognitive variables, suggests that treatment of FAD should focus on
affective rather than cognitive strategies. Because FAD does not seem to be shaped by actual
memory performance or self-awareness during a memory task, feedback strategies may not be
effective in reducing FAD. Conversely, education about risk factors and normal versus abnormal
memory decline may target perceived susceptibility to dementia, thereby reducing perceived
threat.

Similarly, education about availability of treatments and appropriate times to seek

evaluation may decrease FAD. Finally, interventions to shift locus of control regarding AD
development from external (genetics, chance, luck) to internal (lifestyle and health behavior)
may increase self-efficacy and outcome expectations, also reducing FAD. As an example, a
recent Australian public health intervention has shown promise in correcting misperceptions
about dementia and increasing knowledge of and motivation for risk factor change via an
informational website (Farrow, 2013).
The Anticipatory Dementia Index constitutes a promising new method for assessing not
only intensity and implications of FAD, but also personal causes. It may be used to identify
subtypes of FAD that may benefit differentially from interventional strategies. For instance, the
ADI may allow clinicians to determine whether a ‘worried well’ patient simply has a
misperception of his own vulnerability to the disorder, as opposed to a lack of understanding or
motivation to reduce his vulnerability. The first patient may simply need normalizing education
to reduce his fear, whereas the second patient may require more prescriptive lifestyle change to
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address his FAD. Future studies should continue development of the scale with rewording and
revisions of items to address specific facets of FAD.
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Perceived Susceptibility to AD
Beliefs about AD etiology (genetic
vs. lifestyle)
•
Beliefs about AD prevalence
•
Appraisal of one’s memory failures
as normal aging vs. AD-related
forgetting
•
Beliefs about personal likelihood of
having AD
•

Perceived Seriousness of Consequences of
AD
•
Current emotional, cognitive and
physical consequences of perceived
AD symptoms
•
Projected financial, relational,
functional, physical, psychological,
and cognitive consequences of AD

Perceived Benefits & Barriers of Taking
Action
•
Knowledge about treatments for AD
and their effectiveness
•
Knowledge about lifestyle changes
to reduce AD risk and their
effectiveness
•
Likelihood of personally
implementing these measures.

PERCEIVED THREAT
(Perceived likelihood that I
will develop Alzheimer’s
disease)

FEAR OF AD
(Fear that I am developing AD and
cannot avoid the negative
consequences of AD)

OUTCOME
EXPECTATIONS
(Beliefs about ability to
address perceived AD
threat)

Figure 1. Conceptual model for anticipatory dementia
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Figure 2. Scree Plot for Principal Components Analysis of the Anticipatory Dementia Checklist
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Table 1
Demographic characteristics of the total sample and family history positive versus family history
negative participants
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Table 2
Skewness and Kurtosis of Distributions of Outcome Variables
Skewness
None

Moderate

Kurtosis
Substantial

None

STAI State

+

x

STAI Trait

+

x

GDS
MFQ

Moderate

+
x

FADS

+
x

+

x

ADI

x

x

CP Pre-estimate

x

x

CP Trial 1 JOL Estimate

x

x

CP Trial 2 JOL Estimate

+

CP Trial 3 JOL Estimate

+
+

+

CP Trial 1 Resolution

x

+

CP Trial 2 Resolution

x

+

CP Trial 3 Resolution

x

CP Total Resolution

x

+

CP Trial 1 Raw Score

x

-

CP Trial 2 Raw Score

x

x

CP Trial 3 Raw Score

x

x

CP Raw Total

x

x

SP Pre-estimate

x

+

SP Trial 1 JOL Estimate

+
+

SP Trial 2 JOL Estimate

+

SP Trial 3 JOL Estimate

+

SP Trial 1 Resolution

-

+
+
+
+

SP Trial 2 Resolution

x

+

SP Trial 3 Resolution

x

+

SP Total Resolution

-

+

SP Trial 1 Raw Score

x

-

SP Trial 2 Raw Score

x

-

SP Trial 3 Raw Score

x

x

SP Raw Total

x

x

Study Time Difference

Substantial

+

x

Note. STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; GDS = Geriatric Depression Scale; MFQ =
Memory Functioning Questionnaire; FADS = Fear of Alzheimer’s Disease Scale; ADI =
Anticipatory Dementia Inventory; CP = Computer-Paced Condition; SP = Self-Paced Condition;
JOL = Judgment of Learning. No skewness or kurtosis was characterized by skewness or
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kurtosis statistics between -.499 and .499. Moderate skewness or kurtosis describes variable
distributions with skewness and kurtosis statistics between -.999 to -.500 and .500 to .999.
Substantial skewness or kurtosis describes variable distributions with skewness or kurtosis
statistics less than -1.00 and greater than 1.00.
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Table 3
Group mean differences on FAD based on family history of dementia or caregiving history

Note. FADS = Fear of Alzheimer’s Disease Scale; ADI = Anticipatory Dementia Inventory.
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Table 4
Correlations between FAD, subjective memory complaints, and negative affect (n = 88)
MFQ Total
STAI - State
STAI-Trait
GDS
FADS
r
-.444
.169
.154
.214
p
1.20E-5**
.019*
.031*
2.82E-3**
ADI
r
-.326
.209
.248
.287
p
1.69E-3**
3.61E-2*
5.31E-4**
6.2E-5**
Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < 2.50 E-2 (subjective memory complaints Bonferroni-corrected
significance level) or p < 6.25 E-3 (negative affect Bonferroni corrected significance level);
FADS = Fear of Alzheimer’s Disease Scale; ADI = Anticipatory Dementia Inventory; MFQ =
Memory Functioning Questionnaire; STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory; GDS = Geriatric
Depression Scale.
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Table 5
Correlations between FAD versus JOL Estimates and JOL Resolution on Computer-Paced ListLearning Trials (n = 88)

Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < 1.56E-3 (Bonferroni-corrected significance level); FADS = Fear of
Alzheimer’s Disease Scale; ADI = Anticipatory Dementia Inventory; T1 = Trial 1; T2 = Trial 2;
T3 = Trial 3.
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Table 6
Correlations between FAD versus JOL Estimates and JOL Resolution on Computer-Paced ListLearning Trials (n = 88)

Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < 1.56E-3 (Bonferroni-corrected significance level); FADS = Fear of
Alzheimer’s Disease Scale; ADI = Anticipatory Dementia Inventory; T1 = Trial 1; T2 = Trial 2;
T3 = Trial 3.
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Table 7
% Variance Accounted for by the Six Components of the ADI
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Table 8
Component Loadings of ADI Items
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Table 8, Continued
Component Loadings of ADI Items
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Table 8, Continued
Component Loadings of ADI Items
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Table 8, Continued
Component Loadings of ADI Items
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Table 9
Correlations between metacognitive variables and objective memory functioning (n = 88)

Note. * = significant at p < .05; ** = significant at p < 1.04 E-3 (Bonferroni-corrected
significance level); MFQ = Memory Functioning Questionnaire; FADS = Fear of Alzheimer’s
Disease Scale; ADI = Anticipatory Dementia Inventory; CP = Computer-Paced Condition; SP =
Self-Paced Condition; JOL = Judgment of Learning; T1 = Trial 1; T2 = Trial 2; T3 = Trial 3.
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Table 10
Unique variance in objective memory functioning accounted for by metacognitive variables

Note. * = significant at p < .05; ; MFQ = Memory Functioning Questionnaire; FADS = Fear of
Alzheimer’s Disease Scale; ADI = Anticipatory Dementia Inventory; CP = Computer-Paced
Condition; SP = Self-Paced Condition; JOL = Judgment of Learning
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Table 11
Correlations between Measures of Metacognitive Monitoring and Metacognitive Control (n =
88)

Note. * = significant at p < .05; ** = significant at p < .005 (Bonferroni-corrected significance
value); JOL = judgment of learning.
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APPENDIX A
Anticipatory Dementia Inventory (ADI) - Page 1
Below is a list of statements that middle- and older-aged adults might say about
Alzheimer’s disease and how it might affect one’s life. Please read each statement
carefully, and then put an ‘X’ in the box that best represents how much you agree or
disagreement with the statement right now, today.
0 = Strongly
Disagree

1 = Somewhat
Disagree

2 = Neutral /Neither 3 = Somewhat
Agree nor Disagree
Agree
0

1

2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

14

Some forgetfulness is normal for people my age
and older.
It is normal to occasionally forget things ike where
I placed my keys or when I have scheduled
appointments.
Most older people with memory problems has
Alzheimer's disease.
If I am diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease, there is
nothing doctors will be able to do to improve my
outcomes.
Forgetting dates and appointments or where I put
things might mean I have Alzheimer's disease.
Alzheimer's disease is a common problem among
older adults.
I am in control of my health as I age.
I can make changes in my lifestyle that will help
me live a longer, healthier life.
If I am diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease, there is
nothing I can do to improve my outcomes.
There is nothing I can do to slow the aging process
or improve my health as I age.
There is nothing I can do to slow the progresson of
Alzheimer's disease.
I can reduce my chances of developing Alzheimer's
disease by eating a healthier diet.
I can reduced my chances of developing
Alzheimer's disease by staying physically active.
I can reduce my chances of developing Alzheimer's
disease by using my brain in new ways, like doing
crosswords, Sudoku, or reading.

1

4 = Strongly
Agree
2

3

4
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APPENDIX A CONTINUED
Anticipatory Dementia Inventory (ADI) – Page 2
0 = Strongly
Disagree

15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

1 = Somewhat
Disagree

2 = Neutral /Neither 3 = Somewhat
Agree nor Disagree
Agree

I can reduce my chances of developing Alzheimer's
disease by spending time with my family and
friends.
Alzheimer's disease is relatively rare.
If I have a family member with Alzheimer's
disease, I will likely develop it too.
There are no treatments to slow or stop the
progression of Alzheimer's disease.
Whether I will develop Alzheimer's disease will
depend on my lifestyle as well as whether a family
member passed it down to me.
I do not believe that I will develop Alzheimer's
disease.
Thinking about getting Alzheimer's disease does
not make me worry.
There are treatments that can slow or stop the
progression of Alzheimer's disease.
I believe that I am already showing signs of
Alzheimer's disease.
If I had Alzheimer's disease and there was a
treatment to STOP it, I would take it.
If I had Alzheimer's disease and there was a
treatment to SLOW it, I would take it.
I believe that I already have Alzheimer's disease.
I feel calm when thinking about Alzheimer's
disease.
I believe that I am going to develop Alzheimer's
disease.
Alzheimer's disease is inherited from parents.
I do believe that I am showing early symptoms of
Alzheimer's disease.
Thinking about getting Alzheimer's disease makes
me feel anxious.
Thinking about getting Alzheimer's disease makes
me feel hopeless/makes me want to give up.

4 = Strongly
Agree
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APPENDIX A CONTINUED
Anticipatory Dementia Inventory (ADI) - Page 3.
0 = Strongly
Disagree

1 = Somewhat
Disagree

2 = Neutral /Neither 3 = Somewhat
Agree nor Disagree
Agree
0

If I had Alzheimer's disease and there was a
33 treatment to slow or stop it, I would NOT take it.
Thinking about getting Alzheimer's disease makes
34 me feel angry.
Thinking about getting Alzheimer's disease makes
35 me feel sad.
When I think about Alzheimer's disease, my
36 stomach is in knots/I feel nauseated.
When I think about Alzheimer's disease, my hands
37 shake.
38 I lose sleep worrying about Alzheimer's disease.
I find it difficult to concentrate because I am
distracted by thoughts of developing Alzheimer's
39 disease.
Just because I have a family member with
40 Alzheimer's disease does not mean I will get it too.
I worry about losing my memory for loved ones if I
41 develop Alzheimer's disease.
I worry that I will not be able to make decisions
42 independently if I develop Alzheimer's disease.
I worry that I will be a burden on my family if I
43 develop Alzheimer's disease.
I worry about feeling physically unwell if I develop
44 Alzheimer's disease.
I worry about the financial burden of developing
45 Alzheimer's disease.
I worry about how others will judge me if I develop
46 Alzheimer's disease.
I worry about losing important relationships in my
47 life if I develop Alzheimer's disease.
I worry about having to move out of my home if I
48 develop Alzheimer's disease.
I will not be able to contribute to society if I
49 develop Alzheimer's disease.
50 Alzheimer's disease would not really be that bad.

1

4 = Strongly
Agree
2

3

4
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APPENDIX B
Word Lists for List-Learning Task (Woodard, 1991)
Computer-Paced Word List

Self-Paced Word List

reflex

hint

flag

impulse

salad

link

month

toast

idea

mood

plain

queen

winter

pepper

ocean

silence

tank

odor

flower

limb

boulder

iron

insect

market

dust

woods

honor

hall

garden

clock

death

rock

air

anger

heaven

bar

jail

dirt

inn

lord
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Introduction: Fear of Alzheimer’s disease (FAD), or Anticipatory Dementia, is a healthy
adult’s misinterpretation of everyday memory failures as indicators of developing dementia. The
current study investigated the construct of FAD and aimed to contextualize FAD within the
Health Belief Model through development of a new scale, the Anticipatory Dementia Index
(ADI). The study also assessed the relationship between FAD and metacognitive monitoring and
metacognitive control.
Methods: 94 cognitively-intact

community-dwelling older adults with and without a

history of family history of AD completed questionnaires regarding their subjective memory
complaints, state and trait anxiety, depression, and multiple measures of FAD, including the
ADI. Participants also completed a list-learning task in which they were required to provide
Judgment of Learning estimates of their recall after each trial (metacognitive monitoring) and to
adjust their study time based on their perceived performance (metacognitive control).
Results: There were no differences in FAD based on family history of AD or caregiving.
FAD was significantly associated with subjective memory complaints, trait-level negative affect,
and depression.

FAD was not associated with metacognitive monitoring or accuracy of
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monitoring, metacognitive control, or objective memory functioning. Metacognitive monitoring
and increased study time were associated with memory performance.

Finally, the ADI is

comprised of six components that map FAD onto the Health Belief Model.
Conclusions: FAD appears to be more affective than cognitive. Interventions for FAD
should increase public knowledge of prevalence and risk for AD, and increase self-efficacy and
motivation for health and lifestyle changes to reduce AD risk.
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